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THE MESSENGER MODEL:
DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL?
JEFFREY L. HARRISON*
Major transitions in the delivery and financing of health care have
led to numerous organizational changes and innovations. One important
facet of this change involves efforts to increase power on the provider
side of the market as physicians and hospitals confront large buyers who
are able to wield monopsony power.1 Efforts to consolidate on the selling
side have not always run smoothly, and over the past fifteen or twenty
years providers have learned more about antitrust than they would proba-
bly like to know.
In the 1990s, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) and the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued broad and extensive statements
pertaining to enforcement policy in health care markets, including reac-
tions to various provider agreements.2 The latest of these is the 1996
Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Healthcare (Statement).
The objective of the Statement and its predecessors is to reduce uncer-
tainty by announcing in advance the types of mergers, integrations, and
consolidations the enforcement agencies view as unlikely to raise antitrust
concerns. It is important to note that the Statement does not necessarily
reflect antitrust law. In fact, sometimes it reads like an effort to describe
an ex ante settlement agreement in which there is something for both
buyers and sellers.
This last interpretation seems especially appropriate with respect to
Section 9 of the Statement (Statement 9), in which the "messenger
model" is described. The "messenger model" permits competing
providers-physicians, hospitals, etc.-to make use of a common agent in
* Stephen C. O'Connell Chair, University of Florida College of Law; Director, Center
for Teaching and Research. Thanks to Sarah Harrison for her assistance.
I See Roger D. Blair & Jill Boylston Herndon, Physician Cooperative Bargaining Ventures:
An Economic Analysis, supra this issue, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 989 (2004).
2 The initial Statement was issued in 1994 and then revised a year later. The Statement
referred to throughout this article is the one issued in 1996, reprinted at AntitrustEnforcement
Policy in Health Care, 71 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) (Aug. 28, 1996 Spec. Supp.);
available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/hlth3s.htm.
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their dealings with payers. In the terms of the Statement, the "messenger
model" involves the use of "an agent or third party to convey to purchasers
information obtained individually from the providers about the prices
or price-related terms that the providers are willing to accept."' In addi-
tion, "the agent may convey to providers all contract offers made by
purchasers, and each provider makes an independent, unilateral decision
to accept or reject the contract offers."4 The messenger model may not,
however, involve an arrangement that "creates or facilitates an agreement
among competitors on prices or price-related terms."5
This latter qualification is crucial. The model, at least officially, cannot
be used to further efforts to engage in the type of price fixing or stabiliza-
tion that would ordinarily violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act. In
keeping with the objective of precluding price-fixing efforts, the State-
ment includes a list of activities that are off limits for messengers:
* Coordinating the providers' responses to a particular proposal;
* Disseminating to providers the views of other providers;
* Collectively negotiating for providers; and
* Deciding whether to convey an offer to providers based on the
messenger's judgment about the attractiveness of price or price-
related terms. 6
On the other hand, these prohibitions do not preclude efforts by messen-
gers to "help providers understand the contracts offered, for example,
by providing objective or empirical information about the terms of an
offer (such as a comparison of the offered terms to other contracts
agreed to by network participants)." 7 In other words, in what appears
to be a narrow distinction, a messenger may not share the "views" of
one provider with another but can provide information about the "terms"
other providers have already found acceptable.
What makes the messenger model puzzling is that no serious student
of antitrust would conclude that those employing the model precisely
as described in the Statement would be exposed to antitrust liability.
Unilateral agreements with passive suppliers of information are hardly
viewed as suspicious. On the other hand, even those with a modicum of
cynicism must look at Statement 9 with wonder because the structure it
3 1d. § 9, C.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6Id.
7Id.
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describes is ideal for facilitating horizontal price fixing or stabilization.
Indeed, the use of a central figure or agency to coordinate price fixing
by competitors-a hub with price-fixing spokes-is standard antitrust
fare. 8 In addition, DOJ and FTC approval of indirect competitor contact
can make price-fixing claims more difficult to prove because the agree-
ment element of a price-fixing case is typically proven with circumstantial
evidence, including the opportunity to share information. The messen-
ger model, in effect, legitimizes one of the elements that can be crucial
in a circumstantial evidence case.
Given that the drafters of the Statement are well-versed in economics
and antitrust law, a case can be made that Statement 9 carries an implicit
"don't ask, don't tell" message about tolerable limits of collective action.
If implicit approval of collective provider conduct is, in fact, intended,
then a second, perhaps more important, issue arises: could a policy that
permits greater collective action by competitors actually benefit health
care consumers? In other words, suppose that use of the model does
actually increase the incidence of price fixing above what may occur by
virtue of the proverbial locker room conversation. It may not follow that
collective provider action would necessarily harm health care consumers.
In fact, it is possible that some element of increased bargaining power
is a necessary part of a cost-reducing effort.
The questions of what the DOJ and FTC intend and whether it makes
sense from an economic efficiency perspective are critical issues, and
often can be addressed in a straightforward manner. Here, that is not
the case, because an explicit "don't ask, don't tell" policy is one that
would put the chief antitrust enforcement agencies at odds with well-
established case law.9 The antitrust agencies cannot advocate such a
policy openly. Thus, one is left to inferences and the impressions of
others. This gray area of uncertainty is consistent with the existence of
a subtle "don't ask, don't tell" policy. Importantly, whether such a policy
is a good idea amounts to attempting an evaluation of a policy that may
not exist and would be impossible to assess as an empirical matter if it
did exist.
One can, however, at least approach these issues, and this is the
principal purpose here. More specifically, this article makes the case that
the messenger model is either tacitly or inadvertently a "don't ask, don't
tell" policy when it comes to competitor cooperation. In addition, this
article presents an economic framework that explains how such a policy
8 See Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
9 Most directly on point would be Arizona v. Maricopa MedicalSociety, 457 U.S. 332 (1978).
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may benefit health care consumers.'0 Finally, it is suggested that the
"don't ask, don't tell" policy has created an area of per se legality that
precludes an examination designed to distinguish consumer-benefiting
practices from those that provide no benefit. The messenger model
system does have its limits: the DOJ and FTC do take actions when
providers stray well outside of the model. What begins to emerge is an
image of a broad area of give and take between providers and payers
in which some competitor cooperation is tolerated with the referees
intervening only when the action of the "players" becomes too extreme.
I. THE ECONOMICS OF THE MESSENGER MODEL
The express goal of the messenger model is to "minimize the costs
associated with the contracting process" between health care providers
and third-party payers. Two necessary conditions must hold, however,
for this objective to be achieved. First, there must be savings available
to providers; otherwise there is little incentive to engage a messenger."
Second, the cost of the messenger to the provider must be less than
the savings captured by the provider. In sum, the provider will engage
the messenger only if the costs are less than the amount saved and the
provider is able to internalize some portion of this surplus. 12
Even if these conditions are met, there is still no guarantee of a benefit
to health care consumers unless there is also an impact on provider fees.
Provider savings from lower costs of contracting, in theory, may be
reflected in lower charges to patients directly or through insurance
premiums.' 3 The mechanics of how messenger model benefits find their
way to patients is not susceptible to a simple analysis. To understand
why, consider the somewhat tortured route these savings would have to
travel. The provider who engages a messenger and experiences savings
would have an incentive to pass some part of the savings through to
patients. Because most patients will feel health care costs largely in the
form of insurance premiums, 4 the savings "shared" by the physician
would have to be reflected in lower fees charged by physicians to third-
10 A fourth question arises even if one accepts the messenger model at face value. More
specifically, is it the most effective way to achieve the sought-after savings? These savings
are only possible if competition-neutral benefits result from using the model and the costs
of examining those efforts and detecting those that go beyond its limits do not exceed
those benefits.
11 These savings could take the form of lower actual office expenses or lower physician-
provider time spent on non income-generating activities.
11 See generally Blair & Hemdon, supra note 1.
13 Or, in theory, through higher wages when health insurance is part of an employer's
benefit package.
14 Or lower wages.
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party payers who would then lower premiums to subscribers. At one
extreme of the "sharing" scenario, suppose the use of a messenger
enabled a physician to save, after costs, $3.00 per procedure. Further
suppose relative bargaining power in the market is such that the third-
party payers could lower reimbursement rates by an equal amount. 15 The
result in this scenario is that providers will have little incentive to decrease
costs. The analogy here would be to a regulated utility that must pass
its savings through to ratepayers. 6
There are, however, three ways that consumer savings might come
about as a result of physicians employing the messenger model to create
"savings." The first is that the third-party payer simply does not have the
power to exact the entire savings. The portion that the payer is able to
capture is, assuming competitive third-party payer markets, 7 passed on
to consumers.'8 Second, the dominant buyer (i.e., third-party payer) may
understand at some level that there will be no savings unless the parties
are able to solve a strategic problem similar to the prisoners' dilemma.19
In effect, a dominant buyer who adopts the most self-interested strategy
and attempts to capture all the savings will realize that there will be no
savings. A more cooperative strategy that permits providers to capture
part of the savings will actually be more beneficial to payers and providers
and, again assuming competitive third-party payer markets, consumers.
Third, the messenger model may also make it easier for providers to
engage in subtle forms of price fixing that would permit them to keep
some portion, but not all, of the savings.
This third option gives rise to the "don't ask, don't tell" possibility.
Collective actions to increase the bargaining power of providers would
clearly violate the Sherman Act as well as the express description of the
messenger model. This possibility of price fixing as a means of sharing
the savings is not, however, that far-fetched. First, as already noted, it is
hard to comprehend that those approving the messenger model did not
also understand the temptation to collude or, at least, to stabilize prices.
15 Obviously, if providers have some leverage already, they would internalize some of
the gain.
16 The same savings would be possible if the third-party payer, recognizing the potential
for reducing transaction costs, unilaterally lowered reimbursement rates. Here the provider
would adopt the messenger model to avoid losses. This too is like a regulated utility that
is treated, for cost-recovery purposes, as though it is using the most efficient produc-
tion methods.
17 Unless third-party payers resell under competitive conditions, there will be no motiva-
tion to reflect savings in lower premiums.
IS See generally Blair & Herndon, supra note 1.
19 In the Prisoners' Dilemma, both parties must adopt a less than fully self-interested
strategy in order to maximize joint benefits.
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Second, the concept of a trade-off between efficiency and price stability
(i.e., through price fixing) is hardly novel in antitrust circles.20 Moreover,
the underlying theory is not inconsistent with the general policy of
weighing procompetitive effects against anticompetitive effects in other
contexts, including mergers and provider risk-sharing arrangements. 2'
The key point is that the potential trade-off in the messenger model
case is between price fixing in one market and possible benefits in a
different, albeit related, downstream market.
Another economic reality of the messenger model is that potential
savings in contracting costs are likely to be highest when the incentive for
collusion is also the highest. The cost-saving or transaction-cost reducing
element of the messenger model is likely to be greater if the messenger
is itself specialized and can deal in sufficient volume. With any given
volume, savings are likely to increase if the providers are faced with the
same issues, are located in the same communities, and are bargaining
with the same payers. In other words, the potential for both savings and
collusion would seem to be highest when the individual providers and/
or provider networks are close competitors. What is likely to emerge is
ajoint sales agent that, technically, must function as though only a series
of unilateral contacts are involved. Whether this is even possible is itself
an interesting question.2 2 In fact, the instances reviewed below in which
the model has come under scrutiny uniformly involve close competitors.
Again, one would expect the DOJ and FTC to have anticipated this in
drafting Statement 9 and to have concluded that the benefits of shared
savings outweighed the risks of price collusion.
Those who are cynics, or perhaps just realists, about human nature
and markets will undoubtedly see another economic element to the
model. One version of the messenger is a highly ethical person who
is knowledgeable about what information can and cannot be shared.
Whatever the demand may be for these services, there is also likely to
be intense demand for less ethical messengers who will exploit the gray
area of enforcement created by the model. The existence of a messenger
model that has the approval of the chief enforcement agencies may, in
2' See, e.g., Broadcast Music Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979); see generally E. THOMAS
SULLIVAN &JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLI-
CATIONS 132-36 (4th ed. 2003).
21 One cannot help but recall in this context Appalachian Coal v. United States, 288 U.S.
344 (1933), a case that seems inconsistent with most subsequent cases but which has never
been overturned.
22 Its counterpart would be a buying co-op that is permitted to achieve lower prices
because of increased volume but not as a result of increased leverage. See Roger Blair &
Jeffrey L. Harrison, Cooperative Buying, Monopsony Power, and Antitrust Policy, 86 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 331 (1992).
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effect, provide cover for these less ethical messengers. In economic terms,
it lowers the cost of operating unethically by decreasing the likelihood
of detection. If standard economic theory holds, this will increase the
"output" of those willing to take a chance on breaking the rules, and,
therefore, increase the likelihood of competitor (i.e., provider) coopera-
tion. The problem is the empirical question of whether this is good or
bad for consumers.
A final economic complexity involves the incremental impact of the
messenger model on price fixing even if the messengers themselves stick
to the rules. For example, a group of providers may agree on a fee or
exchange information about the fee and then individually convey the
information to the messenger. It is not clear in this instance that the
existence of the third party has increased the likelihood of collusion.
There is, however, the possibility that utilization of the messenger may
make the collusion more difficult for enforcement agencies to detect by
making it appear to have been unnecessary. Thus, although the messen-
ger itself may not be in violation of Statement 9, the use of the messenger
would increase the likelihood of collusion by the providers.
In sum, it is possible that the messenger model can lower transaction
costs. It is also more likely that cost savings measures will be undertaken
if providers are permitted to keep some of the savings. In addition, in
some markets, the only way to retain some of the savings may be for
providers to have additional market power vis-A-vis payers. In effect, the
increased cooperation is analogous to an ancillary restraint, a concept
long embraced by antitrust law. It is equally clear that the DOJ and FTC
cannot adopt an express policy of market equalization. There is, however,
a fair amount of evidence that this is the de facto policy.
II. THE MODEL IN PRACTICE:
DISAGREEMENT AND MISUNDERSTANDING
The analysis above suggests an economic rationale for a "don't ask,
don't tell" policy. A policy that cannot be adopted expressly, however,
can be furthered by creating a gray area of enforcement. In the case of
the messenger model there can be little doubt that such a gray area
exists. Existence of this gray area is exemplified by the confusion the
messenger model has created among scholars, judges, and those in
the industry and the absense of any serious effort to eliminate it. In the
literature, for example, one author touts the messenger model as the
"most promising method currently available for shifting the balance
of power over managed care fee structures back to the independent
2004] 1023
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physicians." 23 Elsewhere it is suggested that following the messenger
model allows physicians to engage in "a kind of 'collective' bargaining
without violating federal antitrust laws." 24 Yet, on its face, if there is
anything Statement 9 seems to rule out officially, it is facilitating a shift
in the "balance of power" or collective bargaining in any sense that the
term is ordinarily used.
2 5
The only reported federal court opinion discussing the model outside
the context of a consent decree also seems to misunderstand the limits
of the model. In Levine v. CentralFlorida MedicalAffiliates, Inc.,26 a physician
sought membership in Healthchoice, Inc., a preferred provider organiza-
tion, and Central Florida Medical Affiliates, Inc. (CFMAI), a physicians'
advocacy group, allegedly as a means of attracting more patients.27 When
admission was denied he claimed that the maintenance of a closed panel
violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 28 For the purposes of examining
the messenger model, it is interesting to focus on the court's characteriza-
tion of one of the defendants-Healthchoice.2 9 Healthchoice marketed
a panel of providers to payers. Provider fees were initially determined
by a relatively complicated formula and then could be changed in negoti-
ations between Healthchoice and payers. The fees were then presented
to providers, who were permitted to opt out of contracts with specific
payers if the negotiated fee was unacceptable. The Healthchoice role was
not to present individual physician fees to possible third-party payers;"°
rather, Healthchoice established an initial fee that was then subject to
negotiation between Healthchoice and payers. The negotiated fee was
then presented to providers on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.
23 Miriam L. Clemons, Don't Shoot the Messenger: Independent Physicians and Joint Payment
Contracting Using the Messenger Model 32 U. MEM. L. REV. 927, 930 (2002).
24 Guy 0. Farmer & John H. Douglas, Physician Unionization-A Primer and Prescription,
75 FLA. B.J. 37, 39 (2001).
215 Such an interpretation would be inconsistent with the teachings of Arizona v. Maricopa
Medical Society, 457 U.S. 332 (1978), which held that horizontal maximum price fixing is
a per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
26 72 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 1996).
27 Part of the complaint stemmed from the suspension of hospital privileges at Orlando
area hospitals.
28 Dr. Levine's lawsuit ultimately failed because of his inability to demonstrate the alleged
violations had harmed competition.
2 For a more detailed analysis of Levine and the messenger model analysis, see James
Ponsoldt & Lance McMillan, The Judicial Legitimization of Horizontal Price-Fixing Among
Partially Integrated Health Care Providers: An Antitrust/Health Care Case Study, 50 ALA. L. REV.
465 (1999).
30 It has been suggested that the court purposely avoided a full discussion of the require-
ments of the messenger model. Id. at 504 n.210.
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Dr. Levine argued that the closed panel was a boycott and that aspects
of the fee determination process constituted illegal price fixing.3' It is
difficult not to see the Healthchoice process as a collective negotiation.
Although individual physicians could opt out of specific contracts, it is
far from clear that this was a realistic option. In any case, the entire
notion of limiting the size of the panel, which Healthchoice did, and
then negotiating fees for the panel, seems at odds with the express
guidelines of the messenger model. In reviewing that claim, the court
seemed to misunderstand what the DOJ and FrC mean by a "messenger"
and found that Healthchoice was, in effect, a messenger. 2 It then took
the DOJ's and FTC's approval of messengers into consideration in find-
ing that the defendants had not violated the Sherman Act.
In the past eight years, one avenue for clarification of the gray area
created by the messenger model outlined in Statement 9 could have
been through cases in which the model was challenged by private parties.
There appear, however, to be no cases in which a private party has
brought a claim based on the use of the messenger model that facially
complies with Statement 9. This makes it difficult to bring the model into
focus and to assess judicial perceptions of its consistency with established
antitrust doctrine. 33
That leaves consideration of actions by the DOJ and the FTC as the
primary source of clues for parsing the messenger model. Although
agency enforcement efforts seem to have increased in the last year or
two, there appear to be no DOJ or FTC actions in instances in which
messengers secretly attempt to go beyond Statement 9 guidelines. Such
an action would likely require going through the relatively expensive and
risky process of proving an agreement through circumstantial evidence-
drawing on the teachings of Interstate Circuit v. United States34-and exam-
ining the actual impact of the messenger model on consumer welfare.
The cases that have been brought by the agencies have involved open
practices that are egregious, with the parties flaunting the antitrust laws
and veering well outside the parameters of the model. The effect of
limiting enforcement actions to "easy" cases is to leave the details of
the messenger model unresolved. It can be inferred, then, that the
enforcement agencies act as referees only when conduct gets seriously
11 72 F.2d at 1541.
32 See generally Ponsoldt & McMillan, supra note 29, at 502-04.
11 According to the 1996 Statement, the desired impact of the messenger model is to
lower the costs of contracting.
- 306 U.S. 208 (1939). This analysis would require the examination of behavior and
opportunities for contact as opposed to direct evidence of agreement.
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out of hand and are willing to allow the parties a fair amount of leeway
within certain limits. Precisely what goes on in secret, when messengers
meet with providers, is anyone's guess. The cynical among us doubt that
messengers always operate as passive conduits or that their clients expect
them to.
One recent case involving a well-publicized action by the DOJ against
the Federation of Physicians and Dentists, Inc.35 illustrates two seemingly
inconsistent realities. First, it is consistent with a persistent willingness
to go after only easy cases, thereby leaving a broad area of behaviorial
possibilities untouched. Second, commentary after the action illustrates
that the model can give rise to significant disagreement over what is
permissible even following the entry of a consent decree purporting to
govern the participants' future conduct. At the time the case was brought,
four major health insurers operated in Delaware with Blue Cross covering
roughly 200,000 residents. All forty-seven of Delaware's orthopedic sur-
geons were providers through Blue Cross. The Federation, principally
a labor organization that has branched out by offering its services to
independent physicians, recruited nearly all of the orthopedic surgeons
in Delaware. When Blue Cross notified the surgeons of a fee cut, the
Federation members agreed that their fees would be negotiated exclu-
sively by the Federation. In addition, the Federation advised the physi-
cians to reject offers made by Blue Cross and to give notice of their
intent to terminate contracts with Blue Cross. The Federation argued
that it was acting as the third-party messenger. The decree required the
Federation to stop the practices the DOJ had identified, to adhere to
the messenger model as understood by the DOJ, and to undertake a
compliance program.3 6
In the aftermath of the decree there has been disagreement about its
implications. In one newspaper report, a defendant-physician in the case
is quoted as saying "this [the consent decree] spells the end for the
insurance companies' way of doing business." 37 Another view was that
the outcome "can help curb abuses and scare tactics commonly utilized
by many payers in their one-sided dealings with busy physicians and
other providers." 38 Other commentators viewed claims of victory by the
Federation as "spin," noting that the restrictions on the Federation after
31 United States v. Fed'n of Physicians and Dentists, Inc., 2002 Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,868
(D. Del. 2002).
36 Id.
37 Tanya Albert, Don't Shoot the Messenger: Path Opens for Contract Talks, amednews.com,
http://www.ama.assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/pick-01/prl 1111 .htm.
m Letter from Hal. K. Litchford to Sharon L.West, (Jan. 26, 2001), available at http://
www.fpdunion.org/federationofphysicians/Private/USvFPD/messenger-model.htm.
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the consent decree were actually more confining than those applied to
messengers more generally. 9 In fact, any victory enjoyed by the defen-
dants could only be viewed as stemming from the fact that more serious
sanctions were avoided. Still, this type of exchange suggests that both
sides believe there is broad room for interpretingjust what a legal messen-
ger model looks like.
In another case, a similar pattern of a messenger acting as a collective
negotiator emerged in Florida in the late 1990s. The Federation of
Certified Surgeons and Specialists, Inc. (FCSS) was composed of twenty-
nine competing surgeons in the Tampa area. FCSS retained Pershing
Yoakley & Associates, P.C. (PYA), an accounting and consulting firm, to
coordinate FCSS's activities aimed at improving "overall managed care
reimbursement. ' 40 PYA represented the surgeons as a group, and negoti-
ated a contract with United Health-Care on terms more favorable than
those offered to the physicians initially. Subsequently, PYA continued to
negotiate with additional payers on behalf of FCSS but stopped upon
learning of the DOJ investigation. Again, the defendants claimed that
they were merely making use of the messenger model as described in
Statement 9. The court noted that the arrangement fell outside the
messenger model because "a legitimate messenger does not coordinate
or engage in collective pricing activity for competing independent physi-
cians." 41 Here again the consent decree required close adherence to the
"messenger model" as understood by the DOJ.
More recently, the messenger model was improperly used by physicians
in both Dallas and Denver, resulting in investigations by the FTC and
consent decrees. The Dallas case involved the use of Systems Health
Providers (SHP) as a messenger on behalf of Genesis Physicians' Group
(GPG), its parent company. SHP actually bargained collectively for GPG
members, as a group, by proposing fee schedules to payers. In addition,
physicians were urged by SHP not to enter into unilateral agreements
with payers. 42 This is obviously quite different than the actions permitted
39 Michael R. Bissegger, Messenger Models Are Still Antitrust Problem for Providers, 20 Bus.
WORD, Mar. 1, 2002, at 9.
40 United States v. Fed'n of Surgeons and Specialists, Inc., 1999-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
72,549 (M.D. Fla. 1999).
41 Id, see also United States v. Woman's Hosp. Found. and Woman's Physician Health
Org., 1996-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,561 (M.D. La. 1996); United States v. Health Choice
of Northwest Mo., 1996-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,606 (W.D. Mo. 1996); United States v.
Heathcare Partners, Inc., 1996-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,337 (D. Conn. 1996).42 FTC Press Release, Dallas-Fort Worth Area Physicians Group Agrees to Settle (Aug.
20, 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/05/denverdocs.htm More recently,
actions have been taken against physicians in St. Louis, South Georgia, Dallas, Fort Worth,
and Asheville, N.C.
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under the messenger model. Adherence to the model would mean that
the messenger would provide individual physicians with information
about possible payers and their offers and leave the decision to the
individual physician.
The Denver case focused on R. Todd Welter & Associates, a consultant-
ing firm, and eight physician groups specializing in obstetrics and gyne-
cology, which were organized as "Professionals in Women's Care." 4 The
group, through Welter, then engaged in boycotts and price fixing. Fees
were negotiated collectively, and fee offers by payers deeded to be "unac-
ceptable" were not communicated to individual physicians. Fees and
terms that were agreed upon were more favorable than those available
to physicians making unilateral decisions.
In all four of these cases, the DOJ or the FTC acted in circumstances
that were quite straightforward. The parties involved would have been
viewed as violating the antitrust laws independent of the existence of a
messenger or any claim to be utilizing a messenger model. Put bluntly,
the cases were easy ones, stressing the difference between collective
negotiations and the messenger as conduit. Since this distiction is plain
from the description of the messenger model itself, the cases did little
to clarify the gray area within which a "don't ask, don't tell" policy can
survive. In fact, if there are two lessons for providers from these cases it
is to be discreet and not too greedy.
Confusion and disagreement are also found among the market partici-
pants affected by the messenger model. In preparing this article, I con-
ducted a modest series of interviews with those in the health care industry
who are principally, but not exclusively, payers. Although not scientific,
the survey yielded responses that were completely consistent with a
broader search of the literature devoted to the messenger model and
the existence of a purposefully created gray area of enforcement. When
asked about the messenger model, responses ranged from "disguised
price fixing" to "it can work as suggested by the guidelines in very few
instances" and "it depends on the market." No one I spoke with viewed
the messenger model as a panacea. Those who described it as potentially
cost saving envisioned a setting in which a messenger canvasses providers
in order to determine what are acceptable fees. 44 In response to fees
then proposed by payers, the messenger can indicate what percentage
of the providers would be likely to find the fee acceptable. Clearly, this
43John W. Jones, Physician Messenger Model Under Fire, PHYSICIAN'S NEWS DIGEST, Feb.
2003.
44 In this sense, the effect is improved information and a smoothly working market. This
is obviously good.
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type of arrangement lowers contracting costs by avoiding one-on-one
negotiations between each payer and each provider.
Interviewees also related experiences that were inconsistent with the
messenger acting as a passive provider of information. In some instances,
payers reported that messengers quickly became hard-nosed negotiators
delivering what were, in effect, take-it-or-leave-it messages from the pro-
vider-physicians. In still other cases, payers found themselves negotiating
with messengers with a deal being struck "subject to the approval" of
the affected providers. Interviewees suggested that the "approval" process
was a charade motivated by the desire to appear to fit within the guidelines
of Statement 9.45
Even those interviewed who had a very negative view of the messenger
model noted that it was impossible to tell whether the messenger made
the likelihood of price fixing any greater, given that providers might
secretly agree on fees before the messenger entered the process.
The possibility of a knowing toleration of a gray area of no enforcement
is also consistent with express elements of Statement 9: it includes ambi-
guities that provide ample "wiggle room" for colorable arguments that
providers followed the rules. To be fair, Statement 9 could not be more
emphatic about the permitted sources of benefits to providers and the
forbidden sources of benefits. The messenger model is "designed simply
to minimize the costs associated with the contracting process," and anti-
competitive measures cannot be used as a means to this end. Questions
arise, however, in the details and the omissions, as is so often the case.
For example, messengers may not provide information about prices and
price-related terms. Presumably, they may provide information about
other terms deemed not to be "price-related." But how broadly is the
term "price-related" to be defined? It would not be unreasonable for
providers to infer that Statement 9's reference here means that joint
agreements on such matters as arbitration clauses, liquidated damages,
and forum selection are permitted areas of collective agreement. 46 But
any negotiated term has a price-like character. In this sense, Statement 9
falls well short of cost-decreasing clarity and creates an inference of
legality with respect to actions that the antitrust laws clearly prohibit. 47
A second ambiguity concernsjust what the messenger may reveal to the
provider. According to Statement 9, the messenger may give a provider "a
11 One interviewee felt that it seemed unlikely that approval of 900 physicians could be
obtained virtually instantly as it was in one case.
46 1 am indebted to Michael Bissegger for suggesting this ambiguity.
41 See, e.g., Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980); Paramount Famous
Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30 (1930).
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comparison of the offered terms to other contracts agreed to by network
participants." On the other hand, in consent decrees, the DOJ has added
that "competitively sensitive information" may not be conveyed. 4 Com-
petitively sensitive information is a provider's "actual or possible view,
intention, or position concerning the negotiation or acceptability of any
proposed or existing payer contract or contract term. '49 The messenger
is permitted to convey accurate information "about a proposed payer
contract offer or contract terms, including, if requested, objective com-
parisons with terms offered to that participating physician by other pay-
ers."50 Two distinctions seem to be at work here. The first is a difference
between offers currently available to the provider (allowed) and those
offers currently available to competing providers (disallowed). Obviously,
the latter type information could be useful for facilitating parallel pricing.
The second distinction is between past economic data and intentions.
This is a fairly common distinction in antitrust with the general sense
being that past information is less likely, or even unlikely, to facilitate
price fixing.5 Still, past information is not wholly useless for price co-
ordination, and the impact of information may vary with market condi-
tions. In markets in which there are numerous competitors, complete
information-even as to intent-does not ordinarily facilitate price fixing
and instead may further sharpen competition. But in markets in which
the number of competitors is small enough to permit collusion, the
same information may be critical for the collusion to take place. The
Statement and subsequent consent decrees seem designed to find a
middle ground in which the information can be used by a physician in
order to contract on the best terms available, but not to open the door
to coordination. But, as suggested here, these possibilities may be more
a function of market conditions than finding precisely the right form
of the information. In any case, the broad language of the Statement
creates significant interpretative questions regarding what is meant by
"contracts agreed to by network participants."
Statement 9 seems, perhaps, naive and imprecise in another respect.
The messenger appears to be principally a conduit and compiler of
information, shuttling between providers and payers. In some instances,
providers have engaged as messengers entities like the Federation of
Physicians and Dentists5 2 that are also labor organizations and which
48 See United States v. Fed'n of Physicians and Dentists, Inc., 2002 Trade Cas. (CCH)
73,868 (D. Del. 2002).
49 Id.
50 Id. (emphasis added).
51 See generally SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 20, at 148-52.
12 See supra text accompanying notes 35-40.
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obviously employ individuals who are adept at negotiations. Presumably,
in addition to a messenger, a provider could hire someone to negotiate
on his or her behalf. There is nothing to suggest this could not be the
same person or entity. In fact, there is nothing to suggest that the same
person or entity could not negotiate for competing providers as long as
they were not treated as a group. Not only does this present the issue
of which role the messenger/negotiator is in at a particular moment
but what information may be divulged from the messenger to the provid-
er(s) .5 For example, as a messenger, information about the offers made
to and acceptable to others appears to be off-limits. 54 On the other hand,
in the role as advisor, consultant, or negotiator, the "messenger" would
seem to be obligated to keep the client informed about what is acceptable
and unacceptable to others. At what point this would cross into the area
of stabilizing prices is not clear, but the dual-role option enhances the
danger by creating the possibility of having to determine the role the
messenger/negotiator is in at a specific time.5 5 This dual-role possibility
clearly increases the costs of detecting illegal activity and may be further
evidence of a tacit "don't ask, don't tell" policy.
III. THE FUTURE OF THE MESSENGER MODEL
The messenger model is in some ways symptomatic of the current
dilemma in antitrust. Beginning with Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania
Inc., 55 the Supreme Court and, presumably, enforcement agencies have
come to realize that practices that restrict some facets of competition
may be necessary to achieve a greater procompetitive end.57 Even the
possibility of permitting some types of price fixing to achieve desired
procompetitive ends is suggested by Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS.58 Still,
no cases have gone so far as to allow price fixing among direct competitors
as a means to achieve a procompetitive end. Moreover, the implicit
53 See, e.g., Letter from Litchford to West, supra note 38.
-4 This, in itself, is not crystal clear as messengers are permitted to offer comparisons
of offered terms to other contracts agreed to by network participants. The key element
seems to be that the offer can be compared to past experience.
55 Commentary after a recent DOJ action against physicians retaining a union as its
messenger suggests that this lack of clarity does exist and allows for different interpretations
of just how far the messenger can go as a negotiator. See supra text accompanying notes
35-40.
56 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
17 In effect, they have revitalized the ancillary restraints doctrine first announced in
United States v. Addyston Pipe, 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), affd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
- 441 U.S. 1 (1979). In BMI, the Supreme Court distinguished literal price fixing from
'per se price fixing." In that case, an agreement among composers to set the price for a
joint license for their compositions held not be be per se price fixing. The Court reasoned
that the agreement on price could have a procompetitive effect.
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bargain suggested here would seem to stretch the teachings of BM/well
beyond their limits. Consequently, if there is a "don't ask, don't tell"
policy implicit in the messenger model, it is likely to remain that way.
A "don't ask, don't tell" policy rules out the type of analysis that would
distinguish messenger models that lead to lower costs for consumers
from those that do not. Ironically, the need to disguise the actual policy
can be traced to the per se prohibition of price fixing itself. Open
toleration of provider cooperation would put the DOJ and FTC at odds
with bedrock antitrust law. And, for the most part, per se prohibition
of some practices makes economic sense because those practices rarely,
if ever, benefit consumers. In effect, the per se rules eliminate the
weighing of costs and benefits of some practices because we know the
answer in the vast majority of instances beforehand.
Here, however, the per se rule, and the resulting "don't ask, don't
tell" policy mean that an ongoing practice cannot be evaluated and may
never be evaluated. In fact, if "don't ask, don't tell" is the effective policy,
then the per se rule against price fixing has resulted in a gray area in
enforcement in which collusion by providers is lawful by default, whether
or not consumers are better off. Whatever the advantages of the per se
rule, they have already been lost in this area and have not been replaced
by a careful examination of the impact of the messenger model on
consumers in a range of market structures.
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